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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BETWEEN BENEFIT AND ABUSE: IMMIGRANT INVESTMENT
PROGRAMS

LEILA ADIM*
INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, an increasing number of countries have
introduced Immigrant Investment Programs (“IIPs”) in order to attract foreign
capital and boost national economies. 1 Canada, St. Kitts and Nevis, the United
States, and Dominica initially implemented IIPs in the late 1980s/early 1990s;
in the rest of the world, IIPs have been adopted only recently. 2 In particular,
except for Ireland and the United Kingdom, 3 European countries avoided the
introduction of similar programs for attracting foreign capital and, until the last
decade, admitted immigrant investors on a discretional basis. 4 However, the
recession in 2008 induced many states of the European Union (“EU”) to change
their approach toward immigrant investors and to regard IIPs as instruments for
emerging from the crisis. 5 Nowadays, these programs exist in almost half of the
continent and represent the gateway of entry for many wealthy foreign
individuals, but what is their overall impact at the domestic and at the global
level?

* Faculty of Law, University of Barcelona (SPAIN), ladimadi8@alumnes.ub.edu.
1. Judith Gold & Ahmed El-Ashram, A Passport of Convenience, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2015,
at 48, 48–49.
2. Xin Xu, Ahmed El-Ashram & Judith Gold, Too Much of a Good Thing? Prudent
Management of Inflows Under Economic Citizenship Programs 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper WP/15/93, May 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1593.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MKR7-LV4U].
3. Id.
4. SERGIO CARRERA, HOW MUCH DOES EU CITIZENSHIP COST? THE MALTESE
CITIZENSHIP-FOR-SALE AFFAIR: A BREAKTHROUGH FOR SINCERE COOPERATION IN CITIZENSHIP
OF THE UNION? 1 (CEPS Paper in Liberty & Sec. in Eur., No. 64, April 2014),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2064%20Price%20of%20EU%20Citizenship%20
final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH5D-N6DH] (recognizing that EU Member States’ discretion over
nationality laws has been reshaped).
5. MADELEINE SUMPTION & KATE HOOPER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., SELLING VISAS AND
CITIZENSHIP: POLICY QUESTIONS FROM THE GLOBAL BOOM IN INVESTOR IMMIGRATION 3 (2014);
Owen Parker, Commercializing Citizenship in Crisis EU: The Case of Immigrant Investor
Programmes, 55 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 332, 332 (2017).
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This Article addresses the various effects that IIPs may have on in- and outmigration of people and capital, with a special focus on the programs that have
been recently introduced in some European countries. The purpose of the
analysis is evaluating whether the benefit that IIPs bring to the host country’s
economy justifies a multilevel pattern of discrimination that may involve tax
residents, tax jurisdictions, and immigrants with different levels of wealth. The
Article is organized as follows: Part I focuses on the main features of IIPs, Part
II addresses discrimination related to the coexistence of preferential tax
treatments and IIPs, Part III examines the effects of IIPs in the ambit of global
(tax) competition, and Part IV approaches the existing disparities in the
admission of immigrants.
I. IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAMS: CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSES
IIPs are foreign capital attraction measures based on a conditional-exchange
logic according to which the host country provides to third-country nationals,
who make substantial investments in the private or in the public sector of the
host country, a preferential procedure for obtaining the right to live within its
borders. 6 These programs can be very different in scope and characteristics, as
every state has shaped IIPs in consonance with its specific needs and priorities. 7
There are IIPs that require private sector investments or job creation, 8 others in
which applicants have to invest in the real estate market, 9 and still others that
request the payment of non-refundable fees to the state 10 or the purchase of
regular or low-interest government bonds. 11
Apart from the type of investment and its extent, which can vary
significantly from country to country, IIPs can also be defined on the grounds of

6. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 49.
7. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 4.
8. United States, France, Singapore, and the Netherlands apply this kind of IIP. Balakrishnan
Prabhu, 25+ Immigrant Investor Citizenship Programs in the World, CORPOCRAT MAG. (Oct. 20,
2015) (Hung.), https://corpocrat.com/2015/10/20/25-immigrant-investor-citizenship-programs-inthe-world [https://perma.cc/M2V7-C6KD]; International Immigrant Investor Programs, EB5
INVESTORS, http://www.eb5investors.com/eb5-basics/international-immigrant-investor-programs
[https://perma.cc/9CW9-8ZLM].
9. This scheme has been adopted by countries such as Latvia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, and
Portugal, whose real estate markets have been badly affected by the recent economic crisis. Prabhu,
supra note 8.
10. This is the case of Caribbean islands such as Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, and
Dominica. Id.
11. Hungary required investment in no-interest government bonds, but as of April 2017, its
program is suspended. Hungary Residency Bond Program to Be Indefinitely Suspended from April
2017, CORPOCRAT MAG., https://corpocrat.com/2017/01/13/hungary-residency-bond-program-tobe-indefinitely-suspended-from-april-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MW6H-ATLL]. Ireland requires an
investment in low-interest government bonds, while the United Kingdom and Australia offer
resident permits in exchange for investment in regular-interest bonds. Prabhu, supra note 8.
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the different “status” conferred to the investor. 12 Some programs allow
applicants to receive temporary residence permits, which can be renewed and/or
turned into permanent permits under specific conditions, while others entitle
investors to directly obtain a second passport and citizenship or a permanent
residence with—or without—the option to apply for citizenship after a few
years. 13
The reasons leading wealthy individuals to opt for IIPs can be related to the
need to find a safe destination for them and their family—especially when they
come from conflict zones—, to overcome travel restrictions through the new
residence permit or passport, 14 to increase their business activity abroad, and
also to pay less tax. 15 The option to pay less tax is regarded with special attention
by those individuals who apply for IIPs in Caribbean offshore jurisdictions.
Dominica, for example, charges almost no taxes to nonresident individuals and
corporations, has very strict financial privacy laws, and, along with St. Kitts and
Nevis, allows people of any nationality to form offshore corporations within its
borders and to open offshore bank accounts. 16

12. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 49.
13. Id.
14. CARRERA, supra note 4, at 5; Parker, supra note 5, at 334 (explaining how IIPs allow
“greater access to global visa travel”). The opportunity to achieve a permit for travelling around
Europe is one of the reasons for the popularity of EU Member States’ IIPs. As a matter of fact, by
providing the immigrant investor with the resident permit, the EU host country opens not only its
borders, but those of the entire Schengen Zone (composed of 26 EU Member States). Schengen
Area Countries List, SCHENGEN VISA INFO, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visacountries-list/ [https://perma.cc/48 SZ-4P5M]. This circumstance is not regarded as threat to the
sovereignty of other EU Member States, as long as the IIP does not confer the right to citizenship
in the absence of a genuine link with the host country. See CARRERA, supra note 4, at 26 (noting
that the European Commission required Maltese authorities to introduce a “genuine link” prior to
acquisiton of Maltese nationality). In this respect, the European Commission and the European
Parliament have taken action against Malta, because, through its IIP, it has conferred Maltese
citizenship and hence also EU citizenship to individuals who have never resided in the island. Id.
By arguing that Malta was “selling” the EU citizenship, the European Institutions affirmed that it
was jeopardizing the duty of sincere cooperation among EU countries and obliged the Maltese
authorities to modify its IIP. Id. However, such an intervention of the European Institutions did not
significantly change the situation, because the concept of “genuine link” is still vague and
discretional: Malta now confers the citizenship after twelve months of residence in the country and
states such as Bulgaria and Cyprus provide investors with a “fast-track” for achieving citizenship.
Id. at 30, 42.
15. Parker, supra note 5, at 334 (recognizing “important tax advantages” as a benefit of IIPs).
16. See DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., HTTP://WWW.DOMINICACITIZENSHIPBYINVEST
MENT.COM/ [https://perma.cc/59AJ-MFGK]; see also G.A. Dwyer Astaphan, Commentary: Who Is
Really Running St. Kitts-Nevis?, CARIBBEAN NEWS NOW! (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.caribbean
newsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Who-is-really-running-St-Kitts-Nevis%3F-20525.html
[https://perma.cc/RM43-ERFH] (discussing examples of several individuals carrying St. Kitts and
Nevis passports who are not natives to St. Kitts and Nevis). See generally SUMPTION & HOOPER,
supra note 5 (discussing the IIPs in Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis).
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However, these are not the only states that attract foreign investment due to
their favorable tax regimes; some European countries lure immigrant investors
through their tax treatments as well. 17 Bulgaria, for example, offers to every tax
resident a 10% flat tax rate on all income levels, 18 while Portugal provides “new”
tax residents with a preferential tax regime for up to ten years including reduced
tax rates and exemptions on income earned abroad. 19 Similarly, in Cyprus,
exemptions on dividends, interest, and capital gains on the sale of real estate
significantly increased the popularity of its IIP, 20 and a conspicuous number of
wealthy immigrants were drawn by the idea of paying zero tax on income earned
in the island. 21 Thus, sometimes, there is no need to invest in a tax haven to
receive residence permits and lower taxation on worldwide income at the same
time. Furthermore, if the host country does not consider tax residence as a
requisite for achieving the right to residency/citizenship, immigrant investors
can decide where to be taxed on their worldwide income in order to obtain the
most advantageous tax treatment. 22
II. IIPS, PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENTS, AND DISCRIMINATION AMONG TAX
RESIDENTS: THE CASE OF PORTUGAL
The issue regarding the combination of IIPs with preferential tax regimes
for foreign investors deals with the first hypothesis of discrimination that will be
examined: Do IIPs generate disparities in the fiscal treatment of tax residents?
For undertaking this analysis, the Portuguese preferential tax regime has been
used as a reference sample.

17. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 6.
18. Id. at 6 n.8
19. Id.
20. LA VIDA GOLDEN VISAS, GOLDEN VISA PROGRAMMES: EUROPE 13 (2017).
21. See Mina Pieri, C. Saava & Associates Ltd., Cyprus Non-Domicile Individuals (NonDom), LEXOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9f927295-18
bb-433e-bb09-4c452f73798a [https://perma.cc/RK56-SUVY]. On July 16, 2015, Cyprus’ House
of Representatives amended the Special Defence Contribution (“SDC”) Law and introduced the
“non-domiciled” individual status. Accordingly, individuals who have not been Cyprus tax
residents during the twenty years prior to the introduction of the mentioned amendment are not
subject to the SDC. This means that these tax residents are not taxed in Cyprus on passive interests,
rental income, and dividends (whether actual or deemed) regardless of the source and regardless of
whether such income is remitted to a bank account or used in Cyprus. Id.
22. See generally LA VIDA, supra note 20.
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The “non-habitual resident” (“NHR”) tax regime introduced by Portugal in
2009 and modified in 2012, 23 is not an integral part of the IIP 24 but represents a
sort of “added value” to the Portuguese tax system that attracts many investors
to the country. It applies to individuals 25 who have not been tax residents in
Portugal during the previous five years. 26 A NHR is exempt from income
taxation on foreign-sourced income if such incomes are subject to tax in a
signatory country of a Double Tax Treaty (“DTT”) with Portugal or, in the
absence of a DTT, if incomes are subject to tax in another jurisdiction and are
not considered to be from a Portuguese source. 27 Some NHR exemptions apply
even when foreign-sourced incomes are exempt in the source country because
they are still considered subject to tax. 28 Consequently, under this preferential
tax regime, cases of double non-taxation are not a remote possibility. In addition,
it provides a 20% flat rate on employee, business, and professional earnings
deriving from highly qualified activities carried out in Portugal. 29
23. See Decreto-Lei No. 249/2009, de 23 de Setembro, art. 4, Alteração ao Código do Imposto
sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Change to Personal Income Tax Code] de 23.09.2009
(Port.) (adding the “non-habitual resident” tax regime to Article 16 of the Portuguese Individual
Income Tax Code). Later modified by Lei No. 20/2012, de 14 de Maio, artigo 5, Alteração ao
Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Change to Individual Income Tax
Code] de 14.05.2012 (Port.).
24. The IIP applies to non-EU individuals who make an investment either privately or through
a company of: at least €1,000,000 in a Portuguese company, or by establishing a Portuguese
company that employs more than ten people, or by purchasing a real estate property with a
minimum value of €500,000. Frequently Asked Questions by Investors Seeking Residency in
Portgual, GOLDEN VISA PORTUGAL, http://goldenvisa-portugal.com/FAQ.html [https://perma.cc/6
FCX-KXDK].
25. According to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Portuguese Indiviual Income Tax Code, tax
residents are those who have their habitual residence in Portugal or who spend more than 183 days
in Portugal in a tax year (Jan. 1st–Dec. 31st) or have/rent a house in Portugal on the 31st of
December of that year with the intention to hold it as habitual residence. Lei No. 106/2017, de 04
de setembro, Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Personal Income Tax
Code], art. 16(1) (Port.).
26. Id. at art. 16(8).
27. Id. at art. 16(15).
28. See id. at art. 81(3)–(5).
29. Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares, art. 99(8); Portaria no.
12/2010, de 7 Janeiro (Port.) (table of activities with high added value qualifiyng for the 20% flat
rate), https://info.portaldasfinancas.gov.pt/NR/rdonlyres/6071C94D-AD61-4C88-99D9-2C7BD0
53BBAA/0/Portaria_12_2010_0701.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6EY-D4TB]. Architects, engineers,
doctors, scientific researchers, people carrying out activities related to information technology and
computing, designers, directors and top executives are included in this category. Portaria no.
12/2010, de 7 Janeiro. Tax relief for attracting human capital is far from being an unusual practice:
the United States and Australia are among the numerous countries which use this method for
incentivizing the immigration of skilled professionals. F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of
Immigration Policies, 16 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 81, 81–91 (1996); David Ley, Seeking Homo
Economicus: The Canadian State and the Strange Story of the Business Immigration Program, 93
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 426, 426–27 (2003).
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The NHR tax regime looks like a hybrid treatment, merging aspects of both
resident and nonresident income taxation, however it cannot be regarded as a
third and autonomous category of taxpayers. Pursuant to the Portuguese Tax
Law, NHRs are residents for income tax purposes as every other individual to
which the general regime applies and their preferential tax treatment is only a
“fiscal benefit.” 30 Portugal, as most of the countries that implement preferential
taxation for attracting foreign capital, justifies the derived disparity in tax
treatment as an exception aimed at satisfying a “public interest”: financing the
expenditure of the state. 31 At this point, a controversy may arise around two
main questions: is not tax fairness a “public interest”? If yes, may the “public
interest” in favoring the financing of the state outweigh the “public interest” in
improving tax fairness?
The relevance provided by the tax systems of democratic countries to the
principles of equity and ability-to-pay denotes that tax fairness is one of the most
important “public interests” to be safeguarded, but it is not always clear whether
it is superior or not to the other, especially when, as in the case of Portugal, the
domestic economy is in recession. 32 Nevertheless, the fact that both are
generally considered as “public interests” suggests that the state has the duty to
balance them in a way that the financing of the public expenditure does not end
in abusive tax discrimination and that safeguarding tax fairness does not lead to
a decrease in economic efficiency. 33
The tax reforms enacted by Portugal in the period in which the NHR’s
regime has been introduced does not look in consonance with this approach. In
the midst of the recent economic crisis, when the IIP appeared for the first time
in the Portuguese Law, “habitual” residents’ tax rates have been severely
incremented, and the increase in the burden on low-income taxpayers has been
more pronounced than in most of the OECD countries. 34 To these observations,

30. Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares, art. 16(8)–(9) (qualifying
as a Portuguese tax resident is necessary to take advantage of NHR regime). Accordingly, “fiscal
benefit” refers to exceptional measures introduced to promote relevant “public interests” that are
greater than that of the taxation they prevent. Decreto-Lei No. 22/2017, de 22 de fevereiro, Estatuto
dos Benefícios Fiscais [Statute of Tax Benefits], art. 2(1) (Port.).
31. Marta Filipa Ramos Mendes, O Novo Regime Fiscal do Residente Não Habitual: Análise
à Luz do Princípio da Não Discriminação no Direito Europeu [The New Fiscal Regime of NonHabitual Residents: An Analysis in Light of the Principle of Non-Discrimination in European Law]
(Aug. 1, 2011) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, Universidade do Porto) (on file with author).
32. Alison Roberts, Portugal’s Austerity Government Feels the Pinch, BBC NEWS (July 2,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23154232 [https://perma.cc/GPH4-MFNB].
33. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 268 (1971); see also John G. Head, Tax Fairness
Principles: A Conceptual, Historical and Practical Review, 9 AUSTRALIAN TAX F. 65, 65–66
(1992) (advocating an “equitable and efficient” tax structure in order to achieve a fair tax system).
34. JOSÉ CASTRO CALDAS, EUR. ECON. & SOC. COMM., THE IMPACT OF “ANTI-CRISIS”
MEASURES AND THE SOCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: PORTUGAL 11 (2013); ORG. FOR
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which highlight that the disparities in the distribution of wealth and the tax
burden went far beyond the provision of a preferential regime for “new” tax
residents, it should be added that the austerity measures implemented for
stemming the crisis also involved a substantial reduction in personal income tax
allowances. 35 It can be said, therefore, that Portugal has prioritized economic
efficiency, even to the detriment of tax fairness.
These considerations confirm that, even when preferential regimes for
“new” tax residents are aimed at satisfying a public interest, they may be
inconsistent with the fundaments of tax fairness, especially in those contexts in
which wealth and tax burden are not equally distributed among the population.
However, does the problem involve IIPs?
Undoubtedly, in a world in which taxation was the same everywhere, the
amount of tax levied by the host country would not be an element to be taken
into account while choosing where to apply for an IIP. However, since that is
not the case, tax matters. Those states that do not offer tax incentives to foreign
investors are likely to entice less wealthy immigrants than neighboring countries
with attractive tax regimes. Accordingly, it is not surprising that those who want
to obtain the right to live in the EU by investing in real estate and maintain, at
the same time, some capital in their country of origin, tend to choose the
Portuguese IIP rather than that of Spain. 36
Thus, the issue regarding preferential regimes and disparities in the tax
treatment of resident taxpayers involves IIPs, as long as these programs are the
vehicle for attracting a group of “privileged tax residents.” In point of fact, many
of these tax residents would not be there without the combination of IIPs and
preferential tax regimes.
Nevertheless, when it comes to migration inside the EU, the situation may
be different. Since EU citizens do not need IIPs in order to reside in another EU
member state, 37 become a tax resident in that country, and take advantage of its
favorable tax regime, preferential tax treatments will continue to generate
disparities even in the absence of IIPs. Hence, it can be concluded that
preferential tax regimes are responsible for creating discrimination among tax
residents, while IIPs are responsible for increasing the cases in which such
discrimination takes place.

ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TAX POLICY REFORMS IN THE OECD 2016, at 32–33
(2016).
35. CALDAS, supra note 34, at 6.
36. The Spanish IIP, as will be broadly explained, is very similar to the Portuguese one;
however, in Spain there are no particular tax incentives for investors who decide to apply. Golden
Visa Comparison: Portugal vs. Spain, LUGNA, https://www.lugna.pt/goldenvisa-portugalspain/
[https://perma.cc/7N78-JUJY].
37. Council Directive 2004/38, art. 7, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 93–94 (EC).
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III. IIPS AND GLOBAL (TAX) COMPETITION
The discussion on preferential taxation necessarily draws the attention to
international tax competition, an argument that strictly involves the attraction of
capital—the raison d’être of IIPs. As mentioned, IIPs exist in a world with
different tax systems and, capital and people being mobile, the way in which one
state exercises its taxing power may have repercussions on other states. 38 This
mobility turns tax treatments into commodities that states commercialize in the
global market at a fair price, in order to maintain “habitual customers” (e.g., tax
residents), and/or at a discounted price to attract “new customers” (e.g.,
investors). 39
In a context in which states must compete to defend or increment their taxing
power, the function of preferential regimes and, in general, of tax systems, is to
attract “new customers,” and the purpose of IIPs is preventing extra-fiscal
restrictions (e.g., migration rules) to hinder such attraction. IIPs become,
therefore, the instrument of a tax competition that can be harmful. In general, it
can be said that IIPs lead to harmful tax competition when they are included in
the legal system of a state offering a wide range of fiscal advantages for
attracting mobile capital, without minding their licit or illicit nature, and in the
absence of transparency and effective exchange of information with other
jurisdictions. 40 This circumstance is common in offshore tax jurisdictions such
as Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis, where IIPs are usually the gateway to an
excessively tax-friendly environment, 41 while in countries like Portugal and
Cyprus, the active fiscal and financial cooperation with other jurisdictions and
the limited extent of the preferential tax regime do not turn their IIPs into
instruments of harmful tax competition. However, it cannot be said that
cooperative countries do not create a climate of tax competition that, albeit nonharmful, reduce the ability of other states to attract foreign capital through IIPs. 42
This leads one to ask: Why are there countries implementing IIPs without
providing for preferential tax regimes for foreign investors?
The existence of IIPs is necessarily an indicator of the clear intention of
some states to attract more foreign capital. However, the argument regarding the
link between IIPs and competition goes beyond taxation because not every
38. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575–76 (2000).
39. See Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Systems, and the Architecture of the Global Economic
System, in TAXATION AND LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION 403, 404 (Vito Tanzi et al. eds., 2008).
40. Patricia Lampreave, Fiscal Competitiveness Versus Harmful Tax Competition in the
European Union, 65 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 6, 8–9, 11 (2011).
41. Duncan Tucker, The High Price of ‘Citizenship by Investment’ in the Carribean,
NEARSHORE AMERICAS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/citizenship-invest
ment-programs-caribbean-fdi/ [https://perma.cc/Y4MV-ZVSQ].
42. See Tanzi, supra note 39, at 404 (“[T]ax competition aims to make a particular location
. . . more attractive than other locations . . . .”).
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immigrant investor makes its choice on the basis of tax considerations. The costbenefit calculus that leads a wealthy individual to apply for the IIP of one
country rather than another may include a variety of factors, which widens the
competitive scenario. 43 For example, those states that have broad welfare
systems, flourishing economies, and political stability do not need to lure
investors through tax incentives. They can eliminate the risk to discriminate
among taxpayers by taxing “new” and “habitual” tax residents in the same
manner and even require—without losing their seductive power—that
immigrant investors contribute more actively to economic growth by creating
jobs. Conversely, countries with a less favorable economic and socio-political
situation may rely on their ability to offer more investment and mobility options
due to agreements on trade and free movement, on their good weather and
beautiful landscapes, or, finally, on preferential tax treatment. These kinds of
states compete among each other in order to become the top destination for
wealthy individuals. They also compete with other countries that may have
different schemes for attracting investment, because, in reality, the peculiarities
of each state and capital mobility are the true factors that generate competition.
Hence, it can be argued that competition is a systemic element in a
diversified global environment, and it can be harmful when artificial and abusive
mechanisms are used for obtaining undue benefits. Nonetheless, even when
competition is non-harmful, it may be unfair if it gives rise to discrimination
both at the national and at the international level. IIPs would not exist if every
country did not have its peculiarities and if capital was immovable. 44 Thus, they
necessarily create competition, but it is up to states that have IIPs to avoid such
competition that ends in abuses and in differentiation between first-class and
second-class individuals.
IV. IIPS AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS: THE CASE OF SPAIN
AND THE EU MIGRANT CRISIS
The argument regarding the discrimination caused by IIPs has already been
addressed in reference to tax residents of countries that offer preferential regimes
to foreign investors; however, the issue is not limited to this case. The existence
of such programs also tends to highlight that there are two categories of
immigrants: the “wanted” and the “rejected,” the “beneficial” and the
“burdensome,” those who can buy a better life and those who have to struggle
to achieve it, the rich and the poor.
Paradoxically, immigrant investors can be considered either economic
migrants, individuals who leave their countries of origin for a new destination
43. See id. at 404–05 (discussing several elements that make a particular location attractive).
44. See Tanzi, supra note 39, at 404 (explaining how a country’s tax base is no longer limited
by that country’s territory, which allows countries to attract foreign financial capital, foreign real
capital, foreign consumers, foreign workers, and foreign individuals with high incomes).
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offering better economic conditions, 45 and/or refugees, individuals that might
have been forced to emigrate because their lives were at risk in their countries. 46
In Europe, where the current migrant emergency involves both economic
migrants and refugees, the discriminatory effect of IIPs may appear quite
pronounced.
Almost half of EU member states have specific programs for attracting
immigrant investors, 47 and each state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has been
free to design the IIP in the way that best suits its needs. The situation is
completely different with regard to non-investor immigrants, since the entry and
the stay of third-country nationals is regulated by common rules that every
member state had to endorse as a requirement for joining the EU. 48 The
difference in the approach to immigration is clearly reflected in the Spanish legal
system, where the rules concerning the admission of immigrant investors are
included in the Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización
[Law for Supporting Entrepreneurs and their Internationalization], 49 while the
requirements that the other foreigners should fulfill to access the country are
established by the Ley de Extranjería [Immigration Law]. 50
According to Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización,
which has been recently modified by the Ley no. 25/2015, 51 an investor visa
valid for one year is provided to immigrants who either directly or through a

45. As affirmed by Anne Althaus: “The term ‘economic migrant’ has no legal definition. It is
not mentioned in any international instruments of migration law. . . . [It] is nevertheless commonly
used in the public discourse, [and] . . . [i]t frequently implies that the migrant has freely decided to
move with the only aim of improving their financial situation . . . .” Anne Althaus, Opinion, The
False Dichotomy Between ‘Economic Migrants’ and Refugees, NEW WORLD, no. 1, 2016, at 10.
46. Id.
47. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 48–49.
48. There is, in fact, a common norm within the EU that prevents Member States from
allowing entry and stay to third-country nationals. Exceptions are made mainly for those who enter
without lucrative purposes, those who already have a signed employment contract, those carrying
out highly qualified activities, and refugees. See Council Directive 2001/40, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L
149) 34, 35 (EC); Council Directive 2003/109, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 16) 44, 46 (EC); Council
Directive 2009/50, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17, 20 (EC); Council Directive 2011/98, art. 1, 2011
O.J. (L 343) 1, 4 (EU); Council Directive 2014/36, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 375, 380 (EU); Council
Directive, 2016/801, art. 1, 2, 2016 O.J. (L 132) 21, 29 (EU).
49. Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización [Law for Supporting
Entrepreneurs and their Internationalization] art. 61 (B.O.E. 2013, 14) (Spain) [hereinafter Ley de
Emprendedores].
50. Ley Sobre Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y su Integración Social
[Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration] art. 25
(B.O.E. 2000, 4) (Spain) [hereinafter Ley de Extranjería].
51. See Ley de Mecanismo de Segunda Oportunidad, Reducción de la Carga Financiera y
Otras Medidas de Orden Social [Second Chance Mechanism Act, Reduction of Financial Burden
and Other Measures of Social Order] (B.O.E. 2015, 25) (Spain) (including a modification to the IIP
aimed at giving “a second chance” to a project that has brought to Spain little foreign capital).
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company: (a) invest €2,000,000 in Spanish government bonds, €1,000,000 in
shares of Spanish companies, or deposit €1,000,000 in a Spanish bank account;
(b) purchase a real estate property with a minimum value of €500,000; or (c)
undertake in Spain a business project that is regarded as being of general interest
(e.g., creation of jobs, relevant socioeconomic impact in the territory, scientific
and/or technological innovation). 52 The foreign investors can then apply for a
residence permit, which is valid for two years and renewable for two-year
periods, provided that they have travelled to Spain at least once during the
period, that they still meet the initial minimum investment requirements, and
have complied with tax and Social Security obligations. 53 Investor visas with a
maximum duration of six months are also provided to foreigners that have
accessed Spanish territory with a tourist visa (ninety-days maximum stay) and
who have not yet formalized the investment. 54
Conversely, the Ley de Extranjería, as every other immigrant law of EU
Member States, establishes that the entry and the temporary residency is allowed
only for non-lucrative purposes. 55 Additionally, evidence must be provided of
the reason for and conditions under which foreigners are entering Spain, as well
as evidence of financial support for their time of stay in the country or the ability
to procure such funds legally. 56 A temporary permit for working reasons is
released only to those foreigners who prove with a project and their financial
means that they are going to start a business activity in Spain, or, in rare
occasions, to those who have signed an employment contract for occupying
specific posts listed by the Spanish Government. 57 This permit allows foreigners
to apply for a special visa at the consulate of Spain in their country of origin in
order to access Spanish territory. 58 Depending on the type of temporary permit,
it can be renewed provided that the foreigner is working or has sufficient
economic means for residing in Spain. 59 Other residence permits may be issued
on the grounds of exceptional situations for international or humanitarian
protection; cooperation with authorities; national security; public interest;
female victims of gender-based violence; and collaboration with authorities
against organized crime and human trafficking networks. 60
The Spanish Law provides formal and practical evidence, by means of
separate regulations and different requirements for entering and staying in the
territory of the Kingdom, that immigrant investors are different from every other
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Ley de Emprendedores art. 63.
Id. at arts. 66–67.
Id. at art. 66.
See Ley de Extranjería arts. 25, 30, 33.
See id. at art. 25.
Id. at arts. 37–38.
Id. at art. 25 bis.
Id. at art. 31.
Ley de Extranjería arts. 31 bis, 33–35.
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foreigner. Such a distinction indicates that a derogation from the EU common
regulations on immigration and from the principle of equal treatment established
by Article 20 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and also by
Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution, is possible when the discrimination
entails an economic benefit to the country. 61 This definition is made, however,
a priori and is grounded on the idea that, unlike other foreigners who want to
live and work in the EU, an immigrant investor may bring to the host country
more benefits than problems. But is this always true? Undoubtedly, economic
migrants who illegally reach the EU are different than those who enter with a
“golden visa” because they are poorer and more in need of public services, but
what will be the impact of both categories in the long term?
Nobody can say if immigrant investors will contribute forever to the
economic growth of the host country. What will the consequences be if they
leave, and, conversely, what effect may the inclusion of other economic migrants
have in the future? It has been said, especially in reference to those countries in
which IIPs provide an important share of revenue, that the potential loss of this
resource is able to provoke an economic crisis. 62 Others affirm that in the
absence of economic migrants, the drop in the birth rate and increasing life
expectancy will lead to a crisis of welfare systems caused by an over-aged
overall population. 63 Nevertheless, it does not seem that these considerations
influence actual immigration policies because, as in the case of the tax resident
discrimination, the positive impact of the entry of immigrant investors is taken
for granted.
However, there is a negative impact of IIPs that most of the EU Member
States have taken into account: the likelihood of illicit capital entering EU
territory. In point of fact, it cannot be overlooked that if the host country cannot
access all the information related to capital invested within its territory, it is
exposed to the danger of being involved in financial crimes and, in particular,
money-laundering. 64 The issue is particularly problematic in the Caribbean,
61. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. art. 14, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Spaniards are equal
before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex,
religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.”); CHRISTOPHER
MCCRUDDEN & SACHA PRECHAL, EUR. NETWORK OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF GENDER
EQUAL., THE CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH 9 n.53 (2009). The equality clause in Article 20 of the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights states: “Everyone is equal before the law.” Id.
62. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 9–10.
63. OECD, IS MIGRATION GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY? 3, 4 (Migration Pol’y Debates, May
2014); see Marshall Fitz, Philip E. Wolgin & Patrick Oakford, Immigrants Are Makers, Not Takers,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 8, 2013, 10:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/im
migration/news/2013/02/08/52377/immigrants-are-makers-not-takers [https://perma.cc/6LWF-JG
X7] (explaining how immigrants in the United States “are a key driver of keeping the Social
Security Trust Fund solvent”).
64. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 23.
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where the low level of fiscal and financial transparency may turn IIPs into an
instrument for laundering illicit capital. 65
Within the EU, the risk of introducing illicit money has been reduced
through the application of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the specific
requirement to invest via bank accounts opened in the host country. 66 Due to
these regulations, credit institutions are obliged to collect information on their
customers and implement strict controls over their transactions. 67
The impact of the directive toward IIPs has been different depending on how
it has been enforced in each Member State. Where credit institutions have not
been too strict in their controls, some cases of money laundering have arisen, 68
while in other Member States excessive risk prevention has been considered as
a determinant of a reduction in potential investors. 69 These considerations,
however, do not regard Hungary, whose vicissitudes related to immigrant
investors have been completely different from those of the rest of EU Member
States. Hungary’s IIP, introduced in 2012, provided permanent residency to
foreign individuals who bought government bonds, but the evidence shows that
the program was only an artificial mechanism for the benefit of a few
companies. 70 During the entire application period of the IIP, which lasted until
the thirty-first of March 2017, credit institutions exercised no real control over
the origin of the capital invested, and public authorities were involved in the

65. Despite the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”)
warning on the likelihood that the IIPs of St. Kitts and Nevis were being used for abusive purposes
and announced sanctions against the country, the governments of the Caribbean have not changed
their approach toward foreign investors and there is still lax control over their activities. See
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-A004, ADVISORY:
ABUSE OF THE CITIZENSHIP-BY-INVESTMENT PROGRAM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERATION OF ST.
KITTS AND NEVIS (2014).
66. See Council Directive 2015/849, art. 1, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73, 83 (EU) (amending the
Regulation 648/2012/EU and repealing Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/70/EC).
67. See id. at art. 1, 2.
68. Henrique Almeida, Chinese Stuck in Portugal’s Visa Limbo, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2016,
6:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-20/chinese-property-buy ers-stuckin-portugal-s-golden-visa-limbo [https://perma.cc/WD4V-QP9W].
69. Antonio Flores, Spanish Banks Shut Doors to Iranian Investors, BELEGAL.COM: BLOG
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://belegal.com/blog-by-antonio-flores/spanish-banks-shut-doors-to-iranianinvestors/ [https://perma.cc/RA63-9Y47] (discussing how Spanish banks have refused to open bank
accounts for Iranian nationals even though there is no specific regulation requiring them to do so).
Malta does not seem to fear the loss in investments and in addition to the anti-money laundering
control, the government authorities undergo the “fit and proper” test, a four-tier due diligence
process in which checks are conducted with the International Criminal Court, INTERPOL, and
various other authorities. MALTA IMMIGRATION, HTTP://WWW.MALTAIMMIGRATION.COM/
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/FFK7-VEPM].
70. BOLDIZSÁR NAGY, INV. MIGRATION COUNCIL & TRANSPARENCY INT’L HUNG., IN
WHOSE INTEREST?: SHADOWS OVER THE HUNGARIAN RESIDENCY BOND PROGRAM 8, 11 (2016).
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corruption. 71 The reasons related to the suspension of the program, which is
probably the beginning of a procedure of abrogation, are unclear; some affirm
that the country had no economic need for the IIP, others that the corruption
scandal became too big, 72 and there is also a part of the public that considers the
IIP’s suspension as a confirmation of the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee
attitude of the government. 73
The latter point brings back the discourse to the wider issue of immigration
and discrimination because in the migrant crisis affecting the EU as a
consequence of the conflicts and political instability in the Middle East and
Africa, the behavior of Hungary toward refugees has not been an exception. 74 In
particular, it should be pointed out that some EU Member States that
demonstrated considerable interest in integrating immigrant investors into their
territory are not being similarly open to refugees.
Although refugees, according to EU law, are entitled to achieve the right to
reside and work within the EU under the same conditions as Member State
citizens, 75 such treatment is by far not comparable to the treatment provided by
some Member States to immigrant investors. A noteworthy element of
comparison in this regard concerns the duration of the procedures for obtaining
the right to live in EU Member States. On average, in the EU, the period for
processing IIP applications and issuing investor residence permits does not
exceed three months, 76 while the period for asylum almost always fails to
comply with the six-month deadline envisioned by the EU Asylum Procedures
Directive. 77 The inefficiency of EU Member States in concluding asylum
processes in a reasonable timeframe has been regarded with special concern by
the EU Commission, which, in order to find a solution for alleviating the burden
that the exceptional flow of refugees brought to Italy and Greece, decided to
adopt the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015. 78 Thus, 160,000
refugees that arrived on the Italian and Greek coasts between 2014 and 2015
should have been quickly relocated in the other EU Member States according to
71. See id. at 11.
72. CORPOCRAT MAG., supra note 11.
73. See Christian Keszthelyi, Hungary to End Sales of Residency Bonds, BUDAPEST BUS. J.
(Oct.
27,
2016),
https://bbj.hu/politics/hungary-to-end-sales-of-residency-bonds_124017
[https://perma.cc/6FQV-Y7H2].
74. Claus Hecking, EU Immigration: Only the Rich Are Welcome, SPIGEL ONLINE (Oct. 8,
2013 10:37 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/immigrants-buy-visas-in-latvia-aseurpoe-locks-out-the-poor-a-926543.html [https://perma.cc/4WNV-4ZPC].
75. See Council Directive 2011/51, art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 132) 1, 2 (EU) (amending Directive
2003/109/EC).
76. See LA VIDA, supra note 20, at 6.
77. Council Directive 2013/32, art. 31, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 60, 77 (EU).
78. Theresa Papademetriou, Refugee Law and Policy: European Union, LAW LIBR. CONG.
(June 21, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/europeanunion.php [https://perma.cc/
DS5D-9JNR].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

BETWEEN BENEFIT AND ABUSE: IMMIGRANT INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

135

a quota plan. 79 The apportionment took into account the size, economy, and
population of each country and aimed at fairly distributing the refugees, but
many Member States opposed the measure. 80 Among them, three had IIPs:
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Hungary. 81
These claims have caused important delays in refugee relocation, and most
of the refugees are still in Italy and Greece. 82 In contrast, no IIPs have been
suspended due to the refugee crisis. 83 Such a diverging approach toward
immigrant investors and refugees is clearly reflected in the case of Malta, the
only EU Member State that establishes a specific quota of IIP applications per
annum. This amount, 1,800 immigrant investors, 84 looks shocking not only in
the light of the quota of 425 refugees that the EU plan allotted to the island, 85
but especially for the fact that, despite the high requirements of its IIP, every
year Malta undertakes to admit a large number of immigrant investors while, by
March 2017, the refugee quota had not been met. 86
CONCLUSION
In a time in which countries are increasingly sensitive to the need to promote
a culture of transparency, integrity, and fairness, the implementation of IIPs
seems in many cases to contradict the efforts aimed at countering abuses and
discrimination.
Introduction of control mechanisms, the presence of small-scale migration
flows, and provision of generous welfare systems are conditions able to
overshadow the detrimental consequences of many IIPs, but these circumstances
do not always accompany IIPs in every country they are found.

79. Id. The EU adopted its refugee redistribution scheme in September 2015. Jean-Michael
Hauteville et al., EU Refugee Quotas Failing Despite Landmark Ruling, HANDELSBLATT GLOBAL
(Sept. 7 2017, 3:02 PM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/eu-refugee-quotas-failing-despite
-landmark-ruling-823289 [https://perma.cc/JD5E-GX3Y].
80. Papademetriou, supra note 78.
81. Council Decision 2015/1601, ¶¶ 46, 47, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80, 86 (EU) (showing United
Kingdom and Ireland opposing the measure); Papademetriou, supra note 78 (showing Hungary
opposing the measure).
82. Papademetriou, supra note 78. As of September, 2017, more than 90,000 refugess are still
waiting in Italy and Greece. Hauteville et al., supra note 79.
83. Cf. CORPORCRAT MAG., supra note 11 (showing that Hungary suspended its programs for
reasons not related to the refugee crisis).
84. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 7.
85. Tom Batchelor, MAPPED: How Many Refugees Each European Country Will Take Under
EU Plan, EXPRESS (May 16, 2016) (U.K.), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607349/Migrant
-crisis-map-EU-refugee-quota [http://perma.cc/7HQL-JP8E].
86. Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism, EUR. UNION (Nov. 2,
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-a
genda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR9GZFZQ].
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The noticeable influence of these programs on in- and out-migration of
individuals and capital has, as a consequence, resulted in the polarization of both
migrants and states. IPPs, in fact, tend to reveal the existence of a wealthier class
of migrants—able to invest in order to skip standard procedures for obtaining
residence permits—and to show that the provision of preferential treatment is
apt to turn states into “top destinations.” Such polarization does not arise from
the willingness to damage a group of migrants or from attempts to undermine
the economy of other countries. Rather, by implementing IIPs, host countries
pursue economic benefits without paying any mind to many of their potential
detrimental consequences.
It can be said that IIPs attract only a limited number of individuals and
amount of capital and that, for this reason, their removal would be irrelevant in
the struggle for global justice. It can be also argued that in the absence of IIPs
there would still be means for shifting capital to “tax friendly” jurisdictions.
Undoubtedly, major problems affect the world and IIPs are only drops in an
ocean of inequality spirals that prevent individuals from having the same
resources available for leading their lives and states from having the same
instruments for competing at the global level. 87
After the Great Recession of 2007–08, there was an increasing interest in all
states toward the elimination of global economic mismatches, and important
achievements have been made in terms of tax justice, transparency, and
cooperation. These efforts were focused on major issues such as the fight against
aggressive tax planning, and small ones, like IIPs, have been wisely left aside.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the negative effects of IIPs are more
tolerable than those of other abusive practices, or that states should remain
indifferent to the discrimination they generate.

87. LLOYD LIPSETT, TAX ABUSES, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT
FINANCIAL FLOWS, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 87 (2013).

